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The post-Gaddafi Libyan war continues along fractured lines of allegiance. 
Various militia networks are in open armed conflict with each other and pitted 
against other jihadist networks. The central government is split in two and the 
United Nations is working to broker a unity government that can offer at least a 
partial solution. One of the contributing factors to this conflict and the 
pervasiveness of jihadist networks in Libya is a Libyan history of conflict 
stretching back to World War I. These jihadist networks arose both before and 
during the civil war. The latest jihadist organization to entrench itself in the civil 
war is the Daesh. In this thesis, Daesh’s expansion in Libya is explored through 
the lens of a political process model. Then, jihadist networks in Libya are 
mapped. Their social ties between each other and other non-jihadist elements of 
Libyan civil society are illuminated in a search of candidate brokers. The most 
influential jihadist brokers are identified and ranked in terms of their relative 
influence. Finally, these insights are used to help define new strategies for 
contending with jihadists in Libya. 
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 1 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Since the overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi Regime in 2011, the 
security situation in Libya has deteriorated. On December 3rd, 2014, the United 
States Department of State issued a joint statement with several European allies 
on Libya indicating that “they expressed grave concern over the deteriorating 
situation in Libya and welcomed the announcement by the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General, Bernardino Leon, that he will 
convene on December 9 a new round of talks bringing together key Libyans.”1 
The deteriorating security situation allowed some jihadist groups in Libya to 
declare formal allegiance to the Islamic State.2 Libyan stability and security are in 
the national interests of both the United States and its European allies. 
Libyan political society is polarizing along ideological lines. One group, 
represented by the ousted General National Congress (GNC) and backing 
General Kalifa Haftar, is more secular and liberal. Aligned against the GNC are 
the Islamists and Jihadi groups primarily represented by the Tripoli-based Libya 
Dawn Government.3 Some of these groups openly conduct training camps and 
recruiting activities that move fighters to Syria and Iraq under the auspices of the 
Islamic State.4 There is also an array of state actors—including Egypt, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—that are looking to protect their 
own security interests in Libya. This body of research will map Jihadist networks 
inside Libya and identify if there are any fissures that can be exploited, in an 
effort to provide insight for policy makers and allow them to formulate effective 
                                            
1 "Joint Statement on Libya." U.S. Department of State. December 3, 2014. Accessed 
December 15, 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234622.htm.  
2 David Stout, “Report: ISIS Takes Control of a Libyan City,” Time, November 19, 2014, 
http://time.com/3593885/isis-libya-iraq-syria-terrorism-derna/. 
3 “Libyan Dawn: Map of Allies and Enemies,” Al Arabiya Institute for Studies, August 25, 
2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2014/08/25/Libyan-Dawn-Map-
of-allies-and-enemies.html. 
4 Borzou Daragahi, “US General Confirms Presence of Isis Fighters in Libya,” Financial 
Times. December 4, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/582dc63c-7bbb-11e4-b6ab-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3OkC1xJe0. 
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strategies that lead to an outcome favorable to the United States. This project will 
also add to a growing database of analysis on social movement theory and its 
application to unconventional warfare. 
This thesis begins with an historical overview of Libya’s past and how it 
has fostered the now fractious conflict and the rise of jihadist networks. It then 
turns its attention to Daesh, the latest jihadist network to entrench itself in the civil 
war. In particular, through the lens of the Doug McAdam’s political process 
model,5 it explores Daesh’s expansion into Libya. Next, ties between jihadist 
networks in Libya and other non-jihadist elements of Libyan civil society are 
mapped in a search for actors in positions of brokerage. The most influential 
jihadist brokers are identified and ranked in terms of their relative influence. 
Finally, the results are examined to determine what methods or strategies can be 
applied to reduce the threat the jihadist networks in Libya pose. This project also 
adds to a growing database of analysis on social movement theory and its 
application to unconventional warfare. 
  
                                            
5 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982). 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Jihadist emigration is one facet of support sustaining the Islamic State. 
Fighters from around the globe, united by a belief that they are fighting for a just 
Islamic cause that supports the Ulama, have left their communities behind for 
Jihad. The geographical region of Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), in particular, stands 
out from others in Libya as a source of these jihadist emigrants. During the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq, this region accounted for 88% of Libyan jihadists immigrating 
to there.6 The region continues to provide manpower for the Islamic State, and 
also harbors training bases for the fighters. As recently as December 2014, 
United States intelligence reports have observed large training camps in eastern 
Libya.7 Historical events in Libya—especially those in the eastern region of 
Cyrenaica—have contributed to this trend of jihadists embarking from, and 
returning to, Libya. This chapter’s analysis of historical events provides a basis 
for understanding how jihadist groups in Libya relate to other factions, the 
population, and the government. 
This phenomenon of jihadist emigration from eastern Libya can be traced, 
in part, to two separate—yet related—historical developments. The first was the 
establishment of the Sunni Islamic order in the early 20th century by the fierce 
insurgencies against Italian colonial rule led by the Grand Sanusi.8 These 
rebellions left a collective mark of armed resistance on Cyrenaician society.9 The 
second was the ideological vacuum created by policies of the Gaddafi régime—a 
vacuum that was filled, in part, with the radical Islamic ideology that is still 
                                            
6 Joseph Felter and Brian Fisherman, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters In Iraq: A First Look at 
the Sinjar Records,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2, 2007, 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-records. 
7 Paul Richter, “U.S. Concern Grows over Islamic State Fighters Training in Libya,” Los 
Angeles Times, December 12, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-libya-isis-
20141212-story.html. 
8 Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949). 
9 Ibid. 
 4 
observable in this region today. It is important to note that Gaddafi and his fellow 
officers removed the Grand Sanusi’s grandson from the throne in 1969.10 
In order to understand how these two factors relate to each other, it is 
necessary to first explore the history of the Sansui order and how they rose to 
power—not just in Cyrenaica, but also across a large part of North Africa. Over 
time, the Sanusi transformed from a religious brotherhood to a political 
organization, and eventually came to be seen as another puppet of Western 
interests during the early period of Libyan statehood.11 The modern order was 
shaped in large part by international politics after each World War.12 The 
pinnacle of Sanusi political achievement came during the creation of the 
Kingdom of Libya by United Nations decree.13 The officially recognized Kingdom 
was short-lived and ultimately replaced by a coup of Libyan military officers 
known as the Revolutionary Command Council led by Muammar Gaddafi.14 
It is under Gaddafi’s dictatorship that we first see the evolution of jihadist 
emigration from Libya to various conflict zones.15 We will examine how Gaddafi’s 
policies created space in eastern Libya’s social fabric that fostered favorable 
conditions for radical Islamists in places like Derna, Benghazi, and Sirte—areas 
where Islamists are very visible at this time. Modern Libyan jihadists have fought 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—and they also continue their struggle at home 
with the February 17th Revolution. These events, influenced by Libya’s past 
experience, are still evolving today. Finally, we will explore current jihadist 
                                            
10 “A Country Study: Libya,” Library of Congress, January 1, 1987. 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ 
lytoc.html. 
11 Evans-Pritchard, Sanusi of Cyrenaica, 158. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Library of Congress, “Country Study: Libya.” 
14 Ibid. 
15 Evan F. Kohlmann and Josh Lefkowitz, “Dossier: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),” 
NEFA Foundation, October 1, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20121004030826/ 
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefalifg1007.pdf. 
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developments in eastern Libya and the developing connections between the 
Islamic State and Libya. 
A. ORIGINS OF THE SANUSI BROTHERHOOD 
The Sanusi order of Islam originated in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. It was 
founded by Algerian scholar and reformer Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi.16 
Sanusi traveled widely across the Sahara and into Saudi Arabia, sampling 
various forms of Sufism and combining what he felt were the best aspects of 
each school of thought into his own ideal.17 “It is true that the Grand Sanusi, like 
the founder of the Wahhabi movement aimed at restoring what he conceived to 
be the original society of the Prophet. Both movements created states, Wahhabi 
in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaicia, based explicitly on religious particularism 
[sic].”18 It is this basic traditional conservative premise that perhaps, in modern 
times, has provided refuge for some of the more radical views on political Islam 
in eastern Libya. The Sanusi order, while conservative, was far from violent or 
exclusionary.19 As Mohammed bin Otsman el-Hachaichi once stated: “I have 
seen only cheerful and smiling faces, welcoming me with benevolence and 
kindness. May God reward them.”20 The Grand Sanusi discouraged the 
trappings of poverty followed by other Sufi Marabouts.21 His vision was that the 
brotherhood should be self-supporting.22 This was a daunting prospect, given the 
Bedouin way of life.23 After being forced to leave Mecca, Sanusi created his first 
zawiya (lodge) in Cyrenaica at Al-Bayda.24 
                                            
16 Evans-Pritchard, Sanusi of Cyrenaica, 6. 
17 Ibid., 6. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 Ibid., 8. 
20 Mohammed bin Otsman el-Hachaichi as quoted in Evans-Pritchard, Sanusi of Cyrenaica. 
21 Ibid., 7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 6. 
24 Ibid., 9. 
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Geographically, Cyrenaica is cut off from neighboring countries by 
deserts.25 The isolation and stark contrast between the green Mediterranean 
coastal areas and the interior created a homogeneous population amongst the 
Bedouin that Sanusi was able to deftly influence.26 The Bedouin tribal system 
embraces common traditions and a strong feeling of community bound by 
blood.27 In establishing and growing his order, Sanusi used connections he 
made during previous travels to Mecca.28 After taking ill for a period of time in 
Siwa (Cyrenaica), Sanusi traveled to Tripoli (Tripolitania) in August of 1841 
where he stayed with friend and protector Ahmad pasha al-Muntasir.29 Early in 
his travels, Turkish administrators viewed Sanusi with suspicion.30 Even so, the 
Sanusi order was able to exploit areas of influence outside of the Turkish 
administration’s grasp.31 “The Sanusiya thus used the Turks to buttress its 
position in its dealings with the tribes, and combined with the tribes to resist any 
encroachments on its prerogatives by the Turkish Government.”32 Here we see 
an example of the Sanusi order working to unite the tribes. The three sides had a 
mutual understanding.33 The Sanusi Order did not ask the tribes to change their 
ways. Instead, they only sought to be a positive moral influence on their 
behavior34 and the tribes welcomed religious men who worked to improve 
conditions.35 And the Turks understood that they could never subdue the entire 
country in the event of a revolt, so they were careful to only ask for reasonable 
                                            
25 Ibid. 
26 Evans-Pritchard, Sanusi of Cyrenaica, 9. 
27 Ibid., 10. 
28 Vikor Knut, Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muḥammad B. ʻAlī Al-Sanūsī and His 
Brotherhood (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1995), 137. 
29 Ibid. 







taxation, peace, and autonomy.36 Pritchard termed it “mutual tolerance.”37 This 
balance stayed in relative equilibrium until world events changed Italy’s strategic 
interests and the Ottoman Empire in the first decade of the 20th century. During 
this period of conflict the Sanusi Order morphed from a religious brotherhood that 
dabbled in administration out of self-interest into a political administration that 
represented the tribal interests and satisfied their constituents’ desire for religious 
order.38 Also during this period, the fierce resistance of the Cyrenaician tribes 
against the Italians was put on full display.39 
B. THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR 
With the exception of their resistance to French expansion north from 
Lake Chad into the Sanusi-controlled Sahara, the order was not viewed as 
overtly militaristic.40 On 29 September 1911, the Italians declared war on Turkey 
and opened hostilities with the bombardment of Derna the following day. This 
period marks the beginning of an organized, armed Libyan resistance to foreign 
invaders.41 “The Italians expected a walk-over and were surprised, then alarmed, 
at the resistance they had to overcome.”42 They also underestimated the level of 
cooperation between the Turks and the Libyan tribes. The Turkish garrisons 
could not have lasted long against the Italians without indigenous support. The 
nature of the war changed quickly due to the tribes’ willingness to resist the 
Italians.43 It changed from a struggle between great nation-states pitted against 
each other, to an attempt to deal with unexpected native resistance, and finally to 
an occupying and aggressive European power trying to deprive native peoples of 
                                            
36 Ibid. 




41 Library of Congress, “Country Study: Libya.” 
42 Evans-Pritchard, Sanusi of Cyrenaica, 110. 
43 Ibid. 
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their liberty. When Turkey made peace with Italy in October of 1912, this by no 
means ended the war for the Sanusi order. Instead, “the order now occupied a 
governmental status of a semi-autonomous state, and as such it led the armed 
resistance to Italian rule.”44 Turkey’s peace with Italy marked the beginning of an 
independent Sanusi armed resistance to foreign occupation. This is particularly 
true in Cyrenaica, the Sanusi center of power.45 A low intensity conflict continued 
until 1917 when Sheikh Sidi Idris—successor to the Grand Sanusi and the future 
king of Libya—negotiated a truce with Italy. The foundation of resistance to 
foreign occupation was laid during the First Italo-Sanusi War and continued 
during the second chapter of that conflict. 
C. THE SECOND ITALO-SANUSI WAR 
“On 6 March 1923 The Italians, without delivering an ultimatum or 
declaration of war carried out their secret and long-prepared plan to seize the 
mixed camps and the Sanusi camp of Khawalan, taking about half the Sanusi 
soldiers prisoners.”46 The fascist government of Italy nullified any previous policy 
or agreements with the Sanusi that recognized Libyan self-rule.47 The second 
war left several indelible marks on Cyrenaician society—scars that especially 
resonated with those with jihadist leanings.48 The second war cemented the 
fierce rebellious nature of Cyrenaician bedouin tribes and created a national hero 
in Sheik Omar Mukhtar. The war also served to further cement the role of Idris as 
the future King of Libya. Finally, and most importantly, it marked the near 
complete destruction of the Sanusi system of influence, “leaving bare beneath it 
the hard wood of the tribal system.”49 
                                            
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 162. 
47 Ibid., 156. 
48 Andrew McGregor, “The Libyan Battle for the Heritage of Omar Al-Mukhtar,” Jamestown 
Foundation, March 10, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37628#. 
VlyES4TaEm8. 
49 Evans-Pritchard, Sanusi of Cyrenaica, 166. 
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The Italians recognized the cultural center of gravity that the Sanusi order 
represented to Libyans and set about its systematic destruction. Unable to fight a 
decisive battle against the Sanusi-led tribes, the Italians switched to brutal tactics 
aimed at tribal encampments and outposts.50 “What gave the Bedouin the 
courage to endure the hardships and bereavements of the struggle? Certainly 
those two great sentiments, patriotism and religion.”51 The second war took on 
the even greater proportions of a holy war—one that was led by a holy man who 
would become a legend. 
Sheik Omar Mukhtar was born in 1862 and took on a prominent role in the 
first Italian war. He was selected to lead the Cyrenaican resistance when Idris 
went into exile in Egypt. Mukhtar was over 60 years old.52 The story of his 
leadership is legendary. “Today the cult of Omar al-Mukhtar is visible everywhere 
in Darnah: on posters, billboards, stickers on car windshields. His face may be 
more ubiquitous even than Kaddafi's.”53 He was eventually captured and hanged 
in a concentration camp in front of twenty thousand people. With Mukhtar’s 
death, the Sanusi-led revolt died and Libya fell under near-total Italian control. 
The memory of this holy struggle is seared in the minds of Libyans. 
D. THE KINGDOM OF LIBYA 
Tobruk is a city of the dead. Not a house is whole and most are 
either rubble or roofless and the place is deserted. No Arabs are 
yet allowed to live in the town though a few come in to work. No 
Italians left. 
—Peter Synge 
In 1943, with the retreat of Italian and German forces, Muhammad Idris 
Sanusi made a triumphant return to Libya.54 Following the near destruction of the 
                                            
50 Library of Congress, “Country Study: Libya.” 
51 Evans-Pritchard, Sanusi of Cyrenaica, 162. 
52 Ibid., 169. 
53 Kevin Peraino, “The Jihadist Riddle,” Newsweek, April 19, 2008, 
http://www.newsweek.com/cover-jihadist-riddle-85605. 
54 Library of Congress, “Country Study: Libya.” 
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Sanusi order and the onslaught of World War II, the question of Libya was put to 
the United Nations. At the time, Great Britain, France, and Italy each 
administered over what is now Libya.55 The effects of nearly thirty years of 
conflict in Libya were abundant: nearly half of its people were refugees; ninety 
percent were illiterate; and the largest sector of the economy was the sale of 
scrap metal salvaged from battlefields.56 Idris did his best to repair a society that 
lacked a social structure, since it had been largely built around the now-ravaged 
Sanusi order. In 1959 Exxon (then Esso) discovered oil in Cyrenaica, and for a 
period Libya’s future looked bight. Idris’s Monarchy maintained close ties to the 
West, and sought to transform Libya’s economy.57 Eventually, Idris’s loose 
federal system could not deliver on its promises of progress and was replaced by 
a unitary state monarchy with a powerful central government.58 Historic 
geographical divisions in Libya were subdivided into 10 separate provinces with a 
head appointed by the central government.59 Despite this transformation, the 
pace of progress continued to lag in the eyes of those who did not benefit from 
the newfound wealth.60 
Despite efforts by the monarchy to promote a sense of Libyan nationalism, 
the society broke down further into a politicized urban elite faction that favored 
non-alignment and the rest who remained in relative poverty and did not obtain 
much benefit from the Western-leaning central government.61 The Monarchy 
also oversaw a period of tremendous social change. Between 1963 and 1973, 
the number of Bedouin living traditional lifestyles went from 320 thousand down 
to 200 thousand—so that they comprised less than 10% of the total population.62 





59 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Libya.” 
60 Ibid. 
61 Library of Congress, “Country Study: Libya.” 
62 Ibid. 
 11 
By September of 1969, these various factions within Libya could endure no more, 
and a group of Army Officers led by Muammar Gaddafi overthrew the Monarchy. 
While King Idris tried his best to cobble back together what the Sanusi system 
had once constructed in Libya, the destruction of the Sanusi system would now 
continue during the reign of Gaddafi. 
E. THE GADDAFI REGIME 
Gaddafi and his fellow officers came into power during a bloodless coup. 
Initially, he was seen as quasi-Muslim fundamentalist, and his system of political 
reform borrowed heavily from Islamic tradition.63 For example, he wanted legal 
matters to be examined in light of Sharia Law and insisted that all laws should be 
based upon this principle.64 However, in spite of his talk in favor of an Islamic-
based society independent of outside influences, Gaddafi would alter his 
narrative and policies to suit what was required to maintain a consolidation of 
power. In the 1970s, after another overthrow attempt, his régime “deliberately 
removed tribal institutions from its political and administrative processes, 
confining them to the social sphere instead: administrative boundaries were 
deliberately drawn to break up tribal unities; and, new ‘modernizing 
administrators’ [sic] without local tribal affiliations were brought in to replace the 
traditional shaykhs.”65 In the late 1980s, Gaddafi reversed his policy yet again 
and courted tribal leaders.66 He was anxious to court these leaders again 
because they could help him identify oppositionists to the regime.67 
Not all of the social changes that occurred in Libya during Gaddafi’s reign 
are traceable to causes that were under his control. The period of his régime 
                                            
63 John Ruedy, ed. Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), 
190. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Omar El-Fathaly, Monte Palmer, and Richard Chackerian, Political Development and 
Bureaucracy in Libya (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1977), 92. 
66 Jason Pack, ed., The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 29. 
67 Ibid. 
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continued to see a massive movement of people into urban areas. 77% of Libyan 
citizens now lived in urban areas, with the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi areas 
accounting for 51% of the total population. Gaddafi did manage to provide 
improvements in education and healthcare.68 In his time, the number of 
universities went from two to nine.69 However, improvements in the quality of life 
and educational opportunities were not enough to fully address the underlying 
reasons for social unrest in Libya. 
When Gaddafi came to power, his policy changes heralded a new era of 
Islamic culture in the country. These changes were short lived. Between 1973 
and 1977 the Régime ordered changes to religious institutions—removing the 
control of religious charities and mosques from the ulama and redefined religious 
law. 
Moreover, Qadhafi's interpretation of Islam was considered radical. 
He considered the Quran to be the only source of sharia and 
community. As did other “Muslim reformers, Qadhafi saw deviation 
from "true" Islamic teachings as the cause of the weakness of 
Islamic lands, including Libya. Like them, he also called for a return 
to the source, the Quran. But unlike most other reformers, Qadhafi 
excluded the hadith and the sunna (the lifestyle and deeds of the 
Prophet) as reliable sources of legislation. By questioning the 
authenticity of the hadith, Qadhafi has in effect dismissed the entire 
edifice of traditional fikh (Islamic jurisprudence). As one scholar, 
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, put it, "discrediting the hadith entails rejection 
of by far the greater part of Islamic law." In essence, Qadhafi 
rejected taqlid (obedience to received authority, i.e., the revelation 
of God to the Prophet Muhammad) in favor of ijtihad (the right to 
interpretation).70 
This further removed and isolated any influence or institutional basis that 
the Sanusi order might have leveraged to bring about another régime change. 
How Gaddafi perceived the Sanusi threat is also evidenced by his downplaying 
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of the role that the order played in the resistance to Italian occupation.71 In 1978, 
Gaddafi seized several mosques and replaced their Imams with ones who were 
more favorable to his views.72 “Qadafi’s [sic] defacto secularism, anticlericalism, 
and defacto anti-sufism have forced the Libyan Opposition to defend the 
traditional Ulama of urban centers.”73 These policies provided a key rallying point 
for those with more conservative or traditional views of Islam to capitalize on—
especially those from Cyrenaica who viewed Gaddafi’s rule as foreign because of 
his bizarre views of Islam. 
Gaddafi’s oppressive practices drove many young Libyans toward the 
Afghan Jihad in the 1980s, and in later years to The Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group (LIFG). In a 2005 interview, Noman Bentoman stated: “You have to take 
into account the situation in Libya toward the end of the 1980's. A lot of young 
people felt desperate because the regime made it very hard for people of Islamic 
persuasion to express their opinion.” 74 The origins of the LIFG predate its official 
announcement in 1995 by nearly ten years.75 In the late 1980s and early 90s, 
more radical elements of Islamists found ideological conditions in Libya 
favorable.76 “In addition to receiving military training from Al-Qaida instructors, 
LIFG recruits were also indoctrinated in Afghanistan by influential jihadist clerics 
such as Al-Qaida co-founder Dr. Abdullah Azzam, whose jihadist writings were 
later posted on the LIFG’s Internet website.”77 
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Amongst the jihadists in Afghanistan and their fellow ideologues in Libya, 
a realization developed that they could use their experience in Afghanistan to 
overthrow Gaddafi—and thus the LIFG was born. The LIFG was not focused on 
global Jihad.78 They were primarily concerned with the overthrow of the Gaddafi 
apostate régime. In response to increasing Islamist unrest, Gaddafi further 
increased repression of Islamic fundamentalists. His régime carried out a 
ruthless offensive in Cyrenaica. Men with beards were arrested and women 
wearing niquab were expelled from universities.79 “In short the Mosque became 
the one place in Libyan society where the Gaddafi regime could not crush all 
dissent or eliminate preexisting social networks.”80 To make matters worse, 
those who were rounded up and thrown in prison did not receive any trial. Others 
were simply eliminated by the régime. On at least one occasion, this occurred en 
masse. In June of 1996, the government killed approximately 1,200 prisoners at 
Abu Salim prison in Tripoli.81 It would be years before the families would learn 
the fate of their loved ones.82 
By 1998, the LIFG and other Islamists were largely neutralized.83 With the 
US invasion and overthrow of the Taliban régime in Afghanistan, the LIFG 
network in Afghanistan was disbanded as well.84 
This led to a period of warming diplomatic relations between Libya and the 
West. In 2007, reformers within the régime led by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi hoped to 
further leverage Western interests by offering amnesty to LIFG members and 
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other Islamists.85 More than 1000 were released from Abu Salim, including over 
200 LIFG members.86 Some had fought in Afghanistan. Less than 60 months 
later, the Gaddafi era was over—but its impact on Libya did not dissipate. “The 
embryonic civil society that had begun to take shape under the monarchy had 
been atomized, and civil freedoms had been suppressed.”87 
F. CONCLUSION 
“With all forms of civil society activity utterly dominated by pro-Qadhafi 
bodies and in the absences of effective opposition within Libya it was perhaps 
unsurprising that Libyan opposition activist would begin to look outside the 
country and to more radical ideologies for solutions.”88 If you take Bentoman’s 
conclusion and view it in light of the brutal wars between the Sanusi and Italy—
which resulted in the loss of the unifying force encompassed in the Sanusi order 
its desire for a traditional and unified Libyan society—it becomes clear how 
violent radical Islam could take root and inspire droves of Libyans to take on the 
mantle of violent Jihad, both at home and abroad. 
The current situation is even more complex. Not only are jihadists moving 
from Libya to Syria and Iraq, they are also returning home to fight in larger 
numbers. The Islamic State established a foothold in the eastern Libya town of 
Darnah.89 In the 1990s, LIFG recruiters found residents of the town of Darnah 
particularly receptive to jihadist propaganda.90 The town’s costal location with 
easy access to sea lines of communication makes travel relatively easy—a factor 
that helps to explain its high representation in the Sinjar records. But this is only 
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part of the story—other underlying causes for the Libyan emigration include the 
ideological, social, and historical reasons addressed in this essay. Given the 
history of Cyrenaica, it is surprising that we do not find even more willing recruits 
from this region. “Despite its oil largesse, the east appears to be almost devoid of 
infrastructure aside from its oil industry.”91 It appears that there is not much else 
to live for if you are a young man in eastern Libya. 
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III. REVIEW OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY LITERATURE 
AND DAESH EXPANSION IN LIBYA 
This literature review encompasses the following points: first, why Libya is 
important; and second, an analysis of the role that influence plays within jihadist 
networks in Libya. The role of influence is further discussed in terms of 
leadership and the concept of brokerage can play in determining outcomes. 
Finally, I will illustrate how Daesh is expanding in Libya using the political 
process theory to explain what factors they are exploiting in Libyan society to 
support their movement. 
A. WHY 
Recent literature covering the changing nature of warfare in the Twenty-
first Century indicates that future conflicts will be carried out primarily against 
networks instead of traditional state actors. Max Boot’s book, Invisible Armies, 
outlines how Unconventional Warfare (UW) is not necessarily a new 
phenomenon. He provides dozens of illustrations where smaller weaker forces 
(guerillas or non-state actors) have taken on stronger opponents. Boot argues 
that if the underdogs can cooperate with conventional forces, receive adequate 
assistance, and produce an effective narrative (or propaganda), they will be more 
likely to succeed.  
The United States Army’s latest operating concept entitled, “Win in a 
Complex World,” is a formal acknowledgement that superior firepower and 
strength of numbers alone do not guarantee a victory. “‘Win’ occurs at the 
strategic level and involves more than just firepower.”92 It defines a complex 
operating environment as such: “Complex is defined as an environment that is 
not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing.”93 Fredrick Wehrey 
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summarizes the social complexities of the post-revolutionary environment in 
Libya by noting that “it is easy to trace Libya’s breakdown as a political struggle 
between Islamists and liberals.”94 In reality, it is a complex mixture of local and 
regional power brokers, former Gaddafi-era technocrats, and contemporary 
revolutionaries, some of whom are former exiled or imprisoned Islamists.95 
Muammar Gaddafi kept the country together by deftly manipulating multiple 
layers of traditional tribal interactions, secular urban elites, and Islamists seeking 
return to Sharia governance.96 
In 2011, the United States and NATO supported an uprising to ouster the 
longtime Libyan dictator. The short-term aim was achieved. Gaddafi was gone 
and an internationally recognized Transitional National Government stood in its 
place. But, Al-Qaeda and like-minded Islamist groups also viewed the Libyan 
revolution as an opportunity. Atiyah al-Libi, an AQ-linked leader killed in 2011, 
wrote in “The Arab Revolutions and the Season of Harvest” that AQ senior 
leadership’s strategic goal in Libya was to foster “a real, radical, and 
revolutionary change that would affirm the supremacy of Allah’s words and the 
dominance of sharia.”97 
Daesh in Iraq and Syria also seeks to leverage the post-revolution chaos. 
One similarity between the AQ and Daesh models for expansion is that both 
groups seek to exploit social and political grievances harbored by local 
populations.98 Additionally, both have a cadre of experienced fighters who have 
served in Syria and Iraq that they can leverage when they return home.99 One 
key difference is that Daesh allows and encourages local fighters to carry out 
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their own struggles against both their near enemy and Western targets as 
well.100 All of this occurs simultaneously while Daesh provides limited and 
unobtrusive support for local administration.101 Utilizing an inverse approach, AQ 
wants their franchises to carry out attacks against Western Targets.102 One 
example is the recent assault on Charlie Hebdo in Paris carried out by an AQ 
fighter trained in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Both AQ and Daesh have had relative degrees of success in leveraging 
aspects of the post-Libyan revolution environment favorable for social 
movements in order to achieve their long-term objectives. AQ and DAESH are 
competing and trying to mold Libya into an outcome that favors their goals.103 
B. INFLUENCE 
To influence the outcome in Libya, policy makers should not think in terms 
of a revolutionary change, but rather in terms of an evolutionary transformation of 
the environment in such a way that it becomes politically favorable to U.S. 
interests and less attractive to elements of Radical Islam. The costs associated 
with revolutionary change in Libya would be too great. Seif al-Islam Gaddafi 
recognized this truth and attempted a similar process in Libya prior to the 
revolution.104 These influence operations can be broken down into those that 
focus on the following areas: personal, structural, and relationships. There is a 
large body of academic literature covering social movement theory (SMT) and 
social network analysis to support these three areas. 
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In identifying who in Libya’s jihadist movements would be in a position to 
influence outcomes, we can search for potential individual and groups with 
certain characteristics. Max Weber defined charismatic authority as “a certain 
quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary 
men and endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically 
exceptional powers or qualities.”105 One such charismatic leader was Omar 
Mukhtar. Both jihadists and non-jihadists alike utilize Mukhtar’s legacy for their 
own gains.106 Weber also stated that leadership could be derived from traditions 
or from a formal position in a bureaucracy.107 Leaders will also exhibit cultural, 
social, and symbolic capital:108 cultural capital is displayed in ties to an 
“aggrieved community and external audiences”; social capital is encompassed in 
strong ties to the sympathetic activist community while also using linkages to 
“broad mobilizing networks.”109 Symbolic capital displays are derived from traits 
like magnetism, prestige, and a moral authority.110 For Daesh’s nascent 
movement in Libya two such individuals, Turki al-Binali and Hussein al-Karami, 
both described in the next chapter, embody Weber’s description. For a 
movement to achieve success, these leaders need to diffuse their ideas and 
orders across a population. This diffusion can be understood in terms of 
brokerage. As Han Shin-Kap notes, the right person is more than just a good 
leader; the best mobilizers (leaders/brokers) will occupy key terrain in a network 
that facilitates mobilization of the movement.111 Additionally, they will fulfill their 
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roll for primarily altruistic versus personal needs.112 In other words, they will 
place the needs of the movement over their own desires for personal enrichment. 
Leadership means little if a movement cannot sustain itself. The 
mobilization and struggle that follows require resources, which are often 
controlled by individuals or small groups who occupy positions of brokerage 
between groups. Ronald Burt refers to these gaps or cross paths as ‘structural 
holes.’113 Burt identifies four levels of brokerage.114 Simple brokerage makes 
people in groups on either side of a structural hole aware of the interests and 
difficulties of the other group. The next level is transferring. Transfer brokers see 
value in the other group’s belief or practice and translate it into a form that is 
digestible for the new group. The third level is analogical. Analogical brokers 
draw analogies between two ostensibly irrelevant groups so they can each 
recognize beneficial value in the ideas, beliefs, and behavior of the other. The 
highest level of brokerage is synthesis. At this level, an observer would actually 
see a combination of new beliefs and behaviors from the other group present in 
the new group.115 These positions of brokerage can be either used to enhance or 
disrupt a network.116 
The final component of Influence is found in relationships. Pre-existing 
social bonds are most important when it comes joining a violent Islamist 
movement.117 According to the Center for Security Policy, over 300 Battar 
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Brigade fighters have returned home to Libya from Syria.118 The Islamic State 
sent a Sharia Law expert and another expert to assist in establishing Islamic 
Government.119 In this respect, the jihadists are working to prevent micro-
mobilization of opposition while enhancing their own position towards 
mobilization.120 
Leaders, structure, and relationships are just a few of the aspects that 
define a social network. For the purpose of this thesis, the defined social 
networks are armed Libyan jihadists seeking to implement their vision of Sharia 
governance. 
C. DAESH EXPANSION IN LIBYA THOUGH THE LENS OF SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT THEORY  
In his book, Disrupting Dark Networks, Sean Everton outlines methods for 
disrupting these networks. His recommendations range from kinetic approaches 
to non-kinetic methods, such as institution building, psychological operations, 
information operations, rehabilitation and reintegration, and tracking and 
monitoring.121 Doowan Lee expands upon these ideas in developing a social 
movement approach to Unconventional Warfare.122 According to Lee, a social 
movement campaign requires two conditions: First, a resistance movement has 
to already exist. Second, those existing social movements must be “malleable 
with UW objectives.” 
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Daesh can be categorized as a social movement that incorporates the 
characteristics of leadership and brokerage previously described. Building from 
Raymond’s work on mapping the Islamic State and his description of leadership 
ties to the Iraqi Bath Party and subsequent connections to the Camp Bucca 
Prison an ensuing analysis of Daesh’s methods of expansion in Libya will reveal 
similar ties and the relative impact that brokerage has on their social movement 
in Libya. 123 
Daesh is emerging as a political entity vying for legitimacy as a political 
system of governance in Libya. Its current expansion into Sirte should not come 
as a surprise.124 In October of 2014, The Libyan Herald reported that Daesh 
planned to start a television station in Sirte.125 The Herald’s report occurred 
weeks before a jihadist network further east in Derna declared allegiance to the 
Islamic State.126 IS sent two emissaries to establish their beachhead on Libyan 
soil. Abu Wissam Abdu Zaid al-Zubaidi and Abu Baraa Azdi used techniques 
they learned in Iraq and applied them in Derna.127 
The Daesh model for expansion can be understood in light of Doug 
McAdam’s political process model and the four factors it identifies that need to be 
in place in order for a social movement to emerge: broad socio-economic 
processes, expanding political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, 
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and cognitive liberation.128 Daesh in Libya is exploiting these factors in order to 
enhance its effectiveness.  
McAdam’s four areas allow for analysis and understanding about how the 
Islamic State is working and expanding in Libya. McAdam’s model assumes that 
a centralized state government works to suppress political activism.129 In Libya, 
the internationally recognized government ousted from Tripoli (and now in 
Tobruk) is led by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thanni.130 This government 
exercises little control over much of the country. A second government spawned 
from dissatisfied Islamists is now based in Tripoli and has elected Omar al-Hasi 
as their Prime Minister.131 In reality, neither government has total control of the 
whole country. Separate bands of Islamists, jihadists, and militias exercise 
physical control in their respective areas and determine who or what ideologies 
should be suppressed or silenced locally. Instead of a centralized government 
denying or repressing political opportunities, each of the various factions in Libya 
exerts influence or repression to forward their own agenda or enhance 
mobilization while suppressing rivals. 
D. DAESH IN LIBYA AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL 
Broad social economic processes contributing to the emergence of Daesh 
have been occurring in Libya since the overthrow of the Senussi Monarchy in 
1969. Initially, when Gaddafi and his fellow officers came into power during a 
bloodless coup, he was seen as quasi-Muslim fundamentalist, and his system of 
political reform borrowed heavily from Islamic tradition.132 “With all forms of civil 
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society activity utterly dominated by pro-Qadhafi [sic] bodies and in the absences 
of effective opposition within Libya it was perhaps unsurprising that Libyan 
opposition activist [sic] would begin to look outside the country and to more 
radical ideologies for solutions.”133 Gaddafi’s removal left a security void that 
Daesh has, in part, filled. In Derna, the city where Daesh gained its initial 
foothold, Human Rights Watch has reported that, since 2013, unknown 
assailants have murdered at least five judges and prosecutors, a female 
lawmaker, and a security official.134 There is no evidence that Daesh was 
involved in these assassinations in order to remove any potential opposition prior 
to the arrival 300 Libyan jihadists, who fought with the Daesh affiliated Al-Battar 
battalions at Deir Ezzor in Syria and then Mosul in Iraq.135 These returning 
jihadis helped start the Shura Council for the Youth of Islam in Derna, a pro-
Daesh faction.136 With its connections to the al-Battar Brigade, Daesh deftly 
navigated the troubled social, political, and economic disparities in Derna to 
establish its foothold. 
With a Libyan foothold established, Daesh could exploit political 
opportunities in the post-revolution environment. The establishment of two 
separate political bodies in Libya allowed it to enhance its prospects as an 
alternative to either the Islamist government in Tripoli or the recognized 
government in Tobruk. For example, IS-aligned jihadists recently took over 
Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte.137 Another Islamist militia from Misrata called 
Brigade 166 surrounded Sirte. The brigade commander acknowledged that 
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several of his IS fighters are from Misrata, and they were somewhat loath to 
attack the center of Sirte because of their tribal connections.138 
The fact that some jihadist factions are loath to repress or dismantle 
Daesh-aligned factions reveals a division among jihadi elites that opens another 
avenue for expanding political opportunities. Additionally, the Islamic State’s hold 
on Sirte demonstrates its pragmatic approach to Libya. When Daesh forced 
former government workers to sign repentance statements Daesh acted in a 
manner consistent with McAdam’s model and exploited fissures within the local 
population there.139 Sirte benefited from the Qaddafi regime, and it is possible 
that those who were employed by the regime are now sitting in the out-group in 
terms of both the Islamist government in Tripoli and the ousted Tobruk 
government. Daesh offers former regime supporters and bureaucrats a second 
chance. Daesh is leveraging broad socioeconomic processes and political 
opportunities to improve their indigenous organizational strength. 
E. THE MOUNTAIN GOES TO MOHAMMED 
The fourth component to McAdam’s political process model is indigenous 
organizational strength.140 A key element of this is conversion potential, which in 
layman’s terms, is the process of bringing people over to your side or your point 
of view.141 Daesh again operates in a manner consistent with McAdams 
description. 
The city of Derna in eastern Libya has a long and well-documented history 
as a fertile recruiting ground for jihadist movements. Daesh views Libya in the 
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same manner as al-Qaeda (AQ), if only to deter their adversary.142 Atiyah al-Libi, 
an AQ linked leader killed in 2011, wrote in “The Arab Revolutions and the 
Season of Harvest,” that AQSL’s strategic goal in Libya is to foster “a real, 
radical, and revolutionary change that would affirm the supremacy of Allah’s 
words and the dominance of sharia.”143 Those seeds of conversion were planted 
by the formation of Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi brigade, which aligned itself with Daesh 
in Syria. The brigade is alleged to have a unit dedicated solely to recruiting 
Libyans.144 
If there is a weakness for Daesh according to McAdam’s model, it lies in 
its indigenous organizations. The Islamic State is not only vying for ousted former 
regime sympathizers in Sirte but is also looking to attract other radical Islamist 
movements in Benghazi, Tripoli, and Derna away from other jihadist camps.145 
USAFRICOM Commander David Rodriguez stated "ISIL has begun its efforts 
over in the east out there to introduce some people over there."146 The 
demographics in Libya are not the same as those in Iraq. There is no large Shia-
Sunni split from which to attract adherents. There is, however, a split over which 
type of government is best suited for the Libyan people. Daesh has thus far been 
able to able to exploit this and General Haftar provides a convenient target that 
all jihadist networks can portray in a tyrannical and almost evil nature. 
In McAdam’s model communication networks and leadership are 
examples of Daesh’s indigenous organizational strength. Its propaganda film 
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showing the beheading of Egyptian Coptic Christians and the subsequent seizure 
and defense of Sirte suggest a centralized production that mimics propaganda 
from Iraq and Syria. However, communicating and coordinating the local 
movement on the ground in Libya may prove difficult. Many of the IS fighters who 
have come to Libya are actually foreigners.147 Daesh has tried to smooth this 
issue over by sending one of its top religious leaders, Turki al-Binali, to preach in 
Sirte. Ironically, Binali is a foreigner himself from Bahrain.148  
Daesh’s movement in Libya will require effective indigenous leadership.149 
“The existence of established organizations within the movement’s mass base 
insures the presence of recognized leaders who can be called upon to lend their 
prestige and organizing skills to the incipient movement.”150 Al-Baghdadi sent 
Wissam Abd al-Zubaidi, one of his most trusted confidants and the former 
governor of Salahuddin province who led the takeover of Tikrit and Beiji, to 
Libya.151 The Daesh is buttressing its “indigenous movement” with the 
ideological leadership of Binali and the organizational leadership of al-Zubaidi, 
and backing them up with Libyan fighters from the al-Battar Brigade to present 
the impression that Daesh in Libya is a localize movement. 
Each of these factors presented by McAdam would, if successful in its 
own right, lead to the state of cognitive liberation. He highlights Piven and 
Cloward’s three necessary cognitions. First, observers in meaningful numbers 
must perceive that the current institutional systems have lost legitimacy.152 
Second, those who ordinarily accept authority in a fatalistic manner must change 
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their views and begin to assert their rights.153 Finally, this same section of society 
must come to believe that they have a capacity (maybe even an obligation) to 
change the circumstances in which they find themselves.154 “Even in the unlikely 
event that these necessary cognitions were to develop under conditions of weak 
social integration, the absences of integrative links would almost surely prevent 
their spread to the minimum number of people required to afford reasonable 
basis for successful collective action.”155 McAdam emphasizes that this cognitive 
liberation must be integrated socially. As applied to Islamic State expansion in 
Libya, Daesh as a social movement must win over more than several isolated 
jihadist groups or disparate communities. 
McAdam’s political process model provides a framework for understanding 
how trust and influence impact the Islamic State’s expansion into Libya. Broad 
socio-economic forces have been at play in Libya since the Italio Senussi wars. 
The discovery of oil and the expectations of modernization, coupled with Arab 
Nationalism, provided another social pressure that compromises a portion these 
broad socio-economic forces. 
Just as we can use McAdam’s model to understand Daesh’s expansion in 
Libya, we can also use it to analyze how Daesh interacts with other jihadist 
networks and non-jihadist factions in Libya. This is no easy task, since the 
groups opposed to the Daesh expansion—the Islamist Dawn coalition and the 
more moderate Dignity coalition provide a natural environment conducive to 
broad social and economic changes that the Islamic State is exploiting. Daesh in 
Libya is borrowing a page from the their expansion playbook in northern and 
western Iraq. They are trying to duplicate their recipe for success. The Gaddafi 
regime overthrow expanded the window of political opportunity to accommodate 
Daesh. It also removed any barrier present in the form of political repression. 
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F.       CONCLUSION 
Currently, the only serious barrier to Daesh expansion comes in the form 
of other Al-Qaeda linked jihadist groups like Ansar al-Sharia or the Mujahedeen 
Shura Council in Derna. Daesh’s indigenous organizational strength lies in its 
Libyan fighters who traveled to Syria and returned to Libya for their second Jihad. 
Still, it does not enjoy the same level of indigenous support as other jihadist 
organizations like Ansar al-Sharia (Benghazi). Part of Daesh’s setback in Derna 
was attributed to their demand for widows to marry Daesh mujahedeen deployed 
in the city.156 Ostensibly, this was a move to shore up indigenous organizational 
strength. Finally, cognitive liberation allows the Islamic State to ascend to 
dominance in selected areas. In Derna, this was a double-edged sword that 
came back to haunt them when the Shura Council mobilized to remove Daesh’s 
grip on the city center.157 The Islamic States leader in Derna, Wissam Abdu Zaid 
al-Zubaidi, allegedly was paraded naked through the streets of Derna Game of 
Thrones style before being executed.158159 
Daesh’s days in Libya may be numbered. The United Nations 
representative has reached a consensus between the rival factions in 
governance for a power sharing agreement between them.160 There is little doubt 
that hardline jihadists like the Daesh and al-Qaeda will disregard any such 
agreement and continue fighting. But this recognition of a single government can 
only work to narrow the window for political opportunity and reduce broad socio-
156 Farrah Schennib*, “The Islamic State Diary: A Chronicle of Life in Libyan Purgatory,” 
Spiegel Online, September 4, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-islamic-state-
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economic factors that the jihadists are exploiting. Any political consensus 
between the different factions will require brokerage to achieve. In the next 
chapter I will map jihadist networks, their ties to each other, and other segments 
of the Libyan population. Key brokers active in the Libyan jihadist movement will 
be identified and their ties illuminated. 
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IV. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter visualizes, describes, and analyzes jihadist networks located 
in eastern Libya—further, it examines how jihadist networks relate to each other 
and other networks. It will also explore the relationship between these networks 
and the fight for supremacy against other government-aligned groups and the 
Libyan National Government itself. 
This chapter examines networks in the coastal cities of Derna and 
Benghazi. Initially, it intended to only examine the movement of foreign fighters 
out of Libya and into Syria and Iraq, but August 2014 news reports indicated that 
the Daesh was attempting to branch out and establish formal governance in 
Derna Libya. A few months earlier, former Libyan Army General, Kalifa Haftar, 
began a military campaign against the hardline Islamist militia groups in eastern 
Libya.161 Thus, it is appropriate to extend this study to include jihadist networks 
beyond foreign fighter movement to examine and understand the dynamics at 
play in Libya. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The following criteria are used to define this network’s boundaries: 1) 
Individuals are identified in open source news and social media providing a 
documented connection or tie with another individual or a connection with a 
jihadist network in Libya; 2) Ties are not limited to jihadist networks. For example, 
tribal ties or business connections are also included; and 3) Organizations must 
be active in Libya or directly tied to someone there. If an individual has a tie with 
an individual or network outside Libya, it was recorded, but only direct 
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connections were used.162 For example, Abu Nabil (Libya) has a direct link to 
Baghdadi (Syria). Baghdadi’s other ties in Iraq or Syria are not recorded. The ties 
used between individuals are: colleague, kinship, communication, and superior 
subordinate. A total of 285 individual (agents) were recorded. A second tie is 
recorded to show an individuals connection to a group or network. The 
organizational nodes and corresponding numbers of sub-categories are: 
academic organizations (1), businesses (7), government organizations (7), 
military organizations (5), political movements (3), religious organizations (6), 
jihadist organizations (18), and tribes (25). To narrow the scope, the social 
network analysis portion is subdivided into three networks: Daesh, other jihadist, 
and non-jihadist networks.163 
To further highlight how the three networks relate to each other a 
boundary spanner potential analysis is run to identify key actors who occupy 
positions of brokerage within the networks.164 “Brokerage and brokerage 
potential provides analysts a better understanding of a network’s inner workings, 
its foundational structure, and its critical facilitating nodes. In a sense, it is these 
nodes, and their associated strong and weak ties, that serve as the skeletal 
frame responsible for holding the network together.”165 Brokerage is more than 
the inner workings of a network. “Bridges, brokers and boundary spanners 
facilitate transactions and the flow of information between people or groups 
separated or hindered by some gap or barrier. This may be a physical gap such 
as geographic location, cognitive or cultural gap such as differing disciplines or 
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professions or alternatively, the gap may be that members of one party have no 
basis on which to trust the other.”166  
C. OVERALL NETWORK 
Figure 1 presents the overall network. It is presented as a multi-modal 
network showing the individuals (round nodes) and their ties to each other and 
various organizations (square nodes). The individuals and their respective 
organizations are color-coded: (1) red for other jihadist organizations, (2) black 
for Daesh, and (3) green for non-jihadist. Studying this network is akin to looking 
back in time. It was not unusual to discover a new individual or tie only after he 
was eulogized following his death. 
Within the network, Daesh’s linkages to other organizations are limited 
when compared to the other jihadist networks. Only four ties are observed 
between Daesh and non-jihadist organizations. Conversely, there are dozens 
links for the other jihadist networks. Of note, there are fourteen pathways running 
between the Daesh network and the other jihadist networks. This reflects the fact 
that as in Syria and other places, Daesh seeks to recruit or co-opt other jihadist 
networks and individuals to their cause.167 The red network depicted in Figure 1 
is actually a conglomeration of networks consisting of several jihadist 
organizations.168 Principal groups comprising the red network are Ansar al-
Sharia, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, February 17th Brigade, Mujahedeen 
Shura Council Derna, and the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council. The red 
network has two unifying characteristics. First, they are opposed to the Dignity 
government in Tobruk and its military leader Kalifa Haftar. Second, they are 
opposed to Daesh. However, as in the Syrian conflict these groups appear 
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pragmatic when seeking tactical gains. In Derna the Mujahedeen Shura Council 
will tolerate a level of cooperation with the Dignity forces against Daesh. While in 
Benghazi, Ansar al-Sharia will collaborate with Daesh against Dignity.169 This 
variable cooperation indicates existing dynamic brokerage occurring between 
different networks. Table 1 shows the top boundary spanner potential scores for 
the 16 actors who played a role in Libya. Daesh occupies three of the bottom four 
positions. The individuals from Table 1 are highlighted showing their positions 
with in the network. 
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Table 1.   Jihadist Brokerage Scores 
Name Jihadist Network Boundary Spanner Potential 
Hafiz al-‘Aghuri Other Jihadist 0.1544 
Abd al-Baset Azzouz Other Jihadist 0.0812 
Jalal Makhzoum Other Jihadist 0.0609 
Nasir Atiyah al-Akar Other Jihadist 0.0604 
Mohammed Darsi Other Jihadist 0.0454 
Imad al-Mansuri Other Jihadist 0.0381 
Abdel Hakim Belhadj Other Jihadist 0.0449 
Wissam Bin Hamid Other Jihadist 0.0435 
Muhammed Abu Farsan Other Jihadist 0.0396 
Imad al-Mansuri Other Jihadist 0.0381 
Salem Derby Other Jihadist 0.0318 
Salem Al-Naaili Non Jihadist 0.0261 
Turki al-Binali Daesh 0.0236 
Wessam Abd Zeid 
(Abu Nabil al-Anbari) Daesh 0.0174 
Zaid Balaam Other Jihadist 0.0156 
Hussein al-Karami Daesh 0.0153 
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D. ANALYSIS OF OTHER JIHADIST NETWORKS 
The red network comprises the other jihadists in eastern Libya. As 
previously mentioned, the multi-party jihadist network appears much more 
developed in terms of the complexity of its structure and ties to other non-jihadist 
networks This is partially a result of the greater time that these networks have 
had to develop. Many of the red jihadist groups date back to the start of the 
Libyan civil war, in which their leaders played a significant role and received a 
greater proportion of media coverage when compared to the recent arrival of 
Daesh.170 Another group, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group can trace their roots 
back to the Afghan Jihad.171 Second, those occupying positions of brokerage in 
this network are exclusively Libyan. This means that there are greater 
opportunities for those jihadists to participate in the Libyan body politic and 
Libyan society writ large. I have included brief profiles of the top three individuals 
in the network and enlarged diagrams highlighting their relative positions. Finally, 
I have included other individuals not based their scores but on the uniqueness of 
their ties. For example, ties to brokers and networks in other locations, civil 
institutions, banks, charities, tribal affiliations, and other elements of Libyan 
society. The descriptions will focus on these ties and how they can enhance 
brokerage potential. 
1. Hafiz al-‘Aghuri 
Hafiz al-‘Aghuri is an al-Qaeda aligned jihadist who has close ties to 
Wissam Bin Hamid and Abd al-Baset Azzouz.172 His position in the network (see 
Figure 1) spans these two high-scoring individuals and results in his subsequent 
highest score.173 Additionally, Aghuri is a member of the member Zawiya 
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tribe.174 This Arab tribe found in Benghazi and further to the south in Kufra. It has 
long running conflict with the African Tabu tribe.175 The Zawiya tribe has 
connections to smuggling routes and oil resources through al-Kufra.176 Aghuri 
could be a position to broker his Zawaya tribal connections in support of the 
larger jihadist cause. 
2. Abd al-Baset Azzouz 
Abd al-Baset Azzouz is an al-Qaeda-aligned jihadist who was sent home 
to Libya by Ayman al-Zawahiri to establish al-Qaeda’s network in Libya.177 
Azzouz’s direct ties to al-Qaeda aligned Hafiz al-‘Aghuri and Nasir Atiyah al-Akar 
solidified his position within AQ’s fledgling network development. Azzouz used 
his connections to plan and execute the attack on the Benghazi consulate.178 
Azzouz also set up a training camp around the city of Derna.179 Azzouz was in a 
position to broker jihadist efforts between Benghazi groups and Derna. However, 
his capture in 2014 could temporarily hinder cooperation between their 
respective networks.180 
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3. Jalal Makhzoum 
Jalal Makhzoum is the leader of the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade. The group 
operates primarily in Benghazi and is a part of the Benghazi Revolutionaries 
Shura Council (BRSC).181 BRSC is a coalition of jihadist militias opposed to 
Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army.182 Makhzoum’s position in the 
network is unique because of his connection with Derna-based Imad al-Mansuri. 
This tie may be of increased importance given the capture of Azzouz. 
4. Imad al-Mansuri 
Imad al-Mansuri is a resident of Derna whose ties to Syria and Iraq 
predate the Daesh expansion into his city.183 His signifigance stems from the 
highest boundary spanner potential score in Derna. His active social media 
account on Twitter remained open until mid-September 2015.184 A documented 
Facebook account is no longer available. He has four close relatives who have 
died fighting in Syria.185 Mansuri shares sympathetic eulogies of martyred Ansar 
al-Sharia commander Mohammed al-Zawahri.186 At the same time, he is also 
supportive of the Abu-Salim Martyrs Brigade. The Martyrs Brigade has refused to 
pledge allegiance to IS and been declared apostate by IS.187 
Mansuri has also hosted gulf state tribal leaders Hamed Ayed al-Ajmi and 
Ali Hadi al-Hajr through his charity, Tajmaa al-Khair.188 “Tajmaa al-Khair has 
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brought Islamist thinkers to Darnah to give lectures to local leaders and 
youth.”189 His social media postings, combined with his charity, support a 
position of brokerage though his family connections to jihadist networks in Syria 
and with other jihadist ideologues in the region. Additionally, his relationship with 
local non-aligned jihadist groups like Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade and Ansar al-
Sharia further his connections between these jihadist factions—and a broader 
audience in the region. 
5. Mohammed al-Darsi 
Mohammed al-Darsi is a Benghazi-based jihadist closely associated with 
Ansar al-Sharia.190 He is a former detainee at Abu Salim prison in Libya. After 
his release from Libyan prison he went to join al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).191 He was 
selected to carry out a suicide attack against the Queen Alia airport in Jordan.192 
The plot was foiled and he was sentenced to life in prison.193 In 2014, he was 
released and returned to Benghazi in exchange for kidnapped Jordanian 
ambassador Fawaz al-Itan.194 He has connections back to an al-Qaeda in Iraq 
bomb maker and a recruiting network.195 His calculated release and subsequent 
reappearance as a Libyan jihadist ostensibly reinforces Ansar al-Sharia’s 
linkages (brokerage) back to Syria and Iraq for the movement of fighters and 
material. His presence would also lend legitimacy to Ansar al-Shari’s cause. 
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Darsi is a close associate of Wissam Bin Hamid, who also claims to have fought 
in Iraq.196 
6. Wissam Bin Hamid 
Wissam Bin Hamid’s position in the network places him in a position of 
brokerage between Jalal Makhzoum’s network and Mohammed al-Darsi’s 
network. Bin Hamid is closely linked to the attack on the U.S. consulate in 
Benghazi, although he states that he did not actively participate in it.197 Bin 
Hamid also has strong connections to al-Jalal in Benghazi. Jihadist factions 
under the BRSC provided a much-maligned security presence at the hospital, 
prompting the hospital administrators to reach out to both the local and the 
Tripoli-based Dawn government for help in convincing the jihadists to give up 
their “security posts” at the hospital.198 The hospital itself as an excellent is an 
example of brokerage via an organization between jihadists and elements of 
Libyan government. 
E. ANALYSIS OF DAESH IN LIBYA 
Daesh’s network appears underdeveloped when compared to other 
jihadist networks. “The Islamic State’s hierarchy inside Libya is murky.”199 While 
it was relatively easy to compile data on the Daesh leadership, it was much more 
difficult to illuminate the underlying layers of subordinate relationships and ties to 
other facets of civil society. This gives the appearance of a less developed and 
interconnected hub-and-spoke design (see Figure 1). This murkiness is driven 
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wholly by Daesh’s need for operational security to guard against pressure from 
other jihadist networks and Haftar’s Dignity forces. 
Analysis for boundary spanner potential shows three key actors who 
occupy positions of brokerage between Daesh and the separate jihadist networks 
and in Sirte the connection to the Farjani tribe. Daesh naturally has ties outside 
of Libya via their brokers. Charlie Winter of the Quilliam Foundation stated with 
regard to Libyan themed propaganda “Among other things, their propaganda 
operations were almost entirely ceded over to the central IS propagandists.” This 
is plainly evident in the content of its Libyan themed propaganda.200 The visual 
imagery of orange jumpsuits, idyllic locations on Mediterranean beaches, and 
threats against western targets strike an all to familiar tone. Additionally, Daesh 
established media points in Derna (no longer operating) and Sirte.201 Signage of 
these points is identical to other points in Iraq and Syria.202 All of this indicates 
highly centralized control. 
1. Turki al-Binali 
In 2013 Baharani citizen Turki bin-Ali began visiting the Libyan City of 
Sirte.203 Turki is one of the top religious figures in The Islamic State.204 Turki has 
close connections with Baghdadi and wants to forge closer ties between militant 
groups in the cities of Darna, Sirte, Benghazi in the north, and the towns of 
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Sebha and Awbari in the south.205 Turki’s movements, residence, and operations 
when in Libya have been under the protection of various extremist groups.206 A 
leading facilitator has been Jama’at al-Tawhid, a Sirte based group not 
associated with the Iraqi group of the same name.207 The group’s only 
referenced connection is back to Binali depicted in Figure 1 by the lone red 
square tied to him. They facilitated a tri-part meeting between Sufian bin-Qumu, 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and Turki.208 Ostensibly, the goal was to facilitate closer 
cooperation, something Ali- has been pushing for in Libya.209 Turki is also 
looking to close geographical gaps in Daesh’s North African network with Boko 
Haram through a 48 year old Awbari based Malian known as Inthamadin al-
Ansari, leader of pro Daesh group Nasar al-Haqq (Azwad Mali).210 
Turki’s ties to Daesh back in Iraq/Syria also run deep. His two brothers Ali 
and Muhammad have had their citizenship revoked by Bahrain.211 They now 
manage a finance unit of Daesh.212 Arguably, Turki has placed himself in a 
position of brokerage between the jihadist factions in Libya and is thus number 
one in terms of potential based on his position in the network. 
2. Wissam Abed Zaid al-Zubeidi (Abu Nabil al-Anbari) 
Roughly six months prior to General Rodriguez’s announcement of jihadist 
training camps in Libya Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dispatched a trusted 
confidant, Salah al Din Governor Abu Nabil al-Anbari (real name Wissam Abed 
                                            
205 Hatitah, “Al-Bin’ali Pushing to Expand.”  
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. Hatitah’s reference to Jama’at al-Tawhid is not associated with the group active in 







Zaid al-Zubeidi).213 Zubeidi, a former Baathist policeman spent time in U.S. 
custody at the Camp Bucca detention facility.214 The former AQ operative led a 
detachment of returning Libyan jihadists to Derna.215 Following the methods 
outlined in Christoph Reuter’s Speigel article Anbari and his group forged 
alliances with groups in and around Derna.216 Anbari also worked to set up 
criminal enterprises to finance efforts in Libya.217 By December 2014, Daesh 
recruiters/facilitators in Turkey told their Libyan counterparts to stop sending 
fighters to Syria and instead focus on domestic attacks.218 Within a few weeks IS 
began taking the cities of Nawfalya and Sirte.219 
3. Hassan al-Karami 
Karami is a Benghazi native in his early twenties.220 He is the highest-
ranking Libyan in the Daesh network. His father is a known Ansar al-Sharia 
financier who lost his electric business when that fact was revealed.221 The 
younger Karami was also involved in Ansar al-Sharia. One can assume that he 
was a natural selection for this position in Daesh because of the brokerage he 
offers to other Benghazi based jihadists or those who are affiliated with Ansar al-
Sharia. Karami spoke out on Libyan television condemning the capture of al-
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Prison,” Al-Masalah News, February 20, 2015, http://almasalah.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx? 
NewsID=47815. Report in Arabic translated by Google Translate. 
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Qaeda operative Abu Anas al-Libi by American forces.222 Statements of support 
like this, address Daesh’s desire to win converts away from al-Qaeda. He speaks 
from a position of authority because of his family linkages to AQ aligned Ansar al-
Sharia.223 
Karami’s brokerage potential is also illustrated in Daesh’s linages to 
Libyan tribal elements. This is one of the Daesh linkages outside of jihadist 
networks I have been able to illuminate. It is alleged that he met with a leader of 
the Farjan tribe to broker a deal in the area of Sirte.224 Daesh in Sirte also counts 
a Farjani tribal member as one of its commanders.225 Additionally, Daesh 
ruthlessly suppressed a Farjani tribal uprising in Sirte sparked by the killing of 
salifast imam Sheikh Khalid Ben Rajah. Rajah refused to accommodate Daesh 
influence in Farjani dominated mosques, leading to the revolt.226 The linkages 
via the Farjani tribe include Kalifa Haftar and the House of Representatives 
based in Tobruk. In the next chapter, I will discuss how this analysis can be used 







                                            
222 Daniele Raineri, Twitter Post, November 26, 2015, 3:49 AM, https://twitter.com/ 
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The prospect of Daesh’s further expansion in Libya is not particularly 
bright, given its relative brokerage deficit compared to the other jihadist factions. 
Based only on the brokerage score it appears al-Qaeda and the other jihadist 
factions enjoy a significant advantage over Daesh.227 Daesh’s brokerage deficit 
may be due to its lack of native Libyans within the brokerage network. Eastern 
Libya is especially distrustful of outsiders, given their history.228 Hussein al-
Karami is Daesh’s highest-ranking Libyan broker. He is ranked last. This lack of 
indigenous organizational strength identified as a potential shortfall in Chapter III 
here it is empirically demonstrated. 
Whereas Daesh’s lack of relative brokerage is a weakness, the other 
jihadist groups can rely on this to mount a united resistance to both Daesh and 
the Tobruk-based Dignity government. This is an aspect that al-Qaeda has no 
doubt been exploiting. The top two brokers in Libya are both documented al-
Qaeda operatives. Other AQ-aligned operatives, like Sufian Bin Qumu and 
Muhammed al-Darsi, remain active in Libya.229 Their individual affiliations will 
likely taint any revolutionary movements they find themselves leading. It would 
be inaccurate to say that all jihadist factions in Libya subscribe al-Qaeda’s global 
Salifi jihadist ideology. But, it is not unreasonable to say there are individuals in 
these networks who subscribe to this ideology. The challenge will come in 
identifying those actors and undermining their authority and degrading their 
capability. 
                                            
227 Daesh’s most influential individual in terms of brokerage is Turki al-Binali with a relative 
score of 0.0236. Comparatively, Hafiz al-‘Aghuri’s score is over six times higher at 0.1544. 
228 A documented resistance to outside influence and control from Italian colonialism and 
King Idris’s ouster because of his ties to the west. 
229 Thomas Jocelyn, “US Captures Benghazi Suspect, but Most Attackers Remain Free,” 
Long War Journal, June 18, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/ 
us_captures_benghazi.php. 
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One aspect both red and black networks share are broker ties to the green 
non-jihadist networks.230 The most common type of ties is with hospitals and 
tribes. Wissam Bin Hamid, Hafiz al-‘Aghuri, Turki al-Binali, and Wessam Abd 
Zeid are all influential brokers with ties to non-jihadist networks. Brokerage is 
occurring at these intersections to gain access to resources (medical treatment) 
and influence within Libyan tribal structures. Another tie from non-jihadist 
networks is Imad al-Mansuri’s Tajmaa al-Khair foundation that includes ties to 
gulf state benefactors. It may be a stretch to say that Mansuri’s charity is non-
jihadist but it can still be classified as a conduit of brokerage in Derna.  
With regard to a long-term political solution via a U.N-brokered unity 
government, any one that is formed will be forced to deal with jihadist factions 
because of the number of ties that they share with non-jihadist elements of 
Libyan society.  Trying to form a government without acknowledging jihadist 
claims in Libya would only would continue exacerbating the underlying causes of 
civil strife in Libya.  Those claims must either be addressed or the sources of 
those claims must be eliminated. As long as the conflict in Libya proliferates al-
Qaeda and Daesh will continue to exploit weaknesses with the goal of exporting 
terrorism across North Africa and into Europe. 
This thesis offers an explanation for why conditions in Libya have been 
conducive to the success of jihadist networks.  In addition it also illuminates how 
Daesh is expanding in Libya.  Ultimately the mapping of the human domain 
illustrates how the jihadists relate to each other and their environment in terms of 
brokerage potential.  This thesis is far from an unabridged product. It does little to 
illuminate the underlying ties within Daesh’s network, which makes it harder to 
develop strategies that would limit Daesh’s brokerage. However, given the 
overall connectivity between non-Daesh Jihadist groups and other Libyan 
political groups, it is reasonable to assume that Daesh’s expansion in Libya will 
face challenges.  
                                            
230 Mapping non-jihadist networks was not the central focus of this study. Thus, those 
networks appear less developed and interconnected. 
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Daesh continually surprises its adversaries and rivals. Their expansion in 
Libya is no exception. In terms of countering non-Daesh Jihadist groups, more 
analysis is needed to map further ties Libyan non-jihadist networks, specifically 
ties within tribal and government networks. Mapping further non-Jihadist 
networks could prove useful to identify alternative nodes and pathways of 
political influence that can be utilized to counter key Jihadist groups. Future 
research should revolve around continued mapping of tribal and government ties.  
Those results could be used in brokering a unity government. 
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